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STATE ACTION IN SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS,
INC. V. UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE:
LET THE GAMES BEGIN
The important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but
to take part, the important thing in life is not the triumph but the
struggle. The essential thing is not to have conquered but to have
fought well. To spread these precepts is to build up a stronger
and more valiant and, above all, more scrupulous and more gen-
erous humanity. I
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress promulgated the Amateur Sports Act2 (ASA)
which formally incorporated the entity commonly known as the United
States Olympic Committee (USOC).3 In addition to defining the objec-
tives and purposes of the USOC,4 Congress created and granted to the
USOC an exclusive-use right to the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," "Ci-
tius Altius Fortius" and any other combination or simulation of these
protected words that would tend to cause confusion with the USOC's use
1. B. HENRY & P. YEOMANS, AN APPROVED HISTORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 1
(1984) (quoting Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the International Olympic Committee and
modem Olympic Games). This idea has been adopted by the Committee as a basic Olympic
principle. See International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 982, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983), permanent injunction
aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987). For additional information on the
International Olympic Committee, see infira notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
2. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1982).
3. Id. §§ 371-372.
4. Id. § 374. For example, the statute specifies, in pertinent part, that the USOC shall:
(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encourage the attain-
ment of those goals; (2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the
United States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, so as to
foster productive working relationships among sports-related organizations; (3) ex-
ercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constituent members of
committees, over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United States in
the Olympic Games... including the representation of the United States in such
games, and over the organization of the Olympic Games... when held in the United
States; (4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the appro-
priate national governing body, the most competent amateur representation possible
in each competition and event of the Olympic Games...; [and] (5) promote and
support amateur athletic activities involving the United States and foreign nations
Id.
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of the words.' The ban on the use of these words by others, however,
only extends to situations where the word is being used to promote the
sale of goods or services, or where the word is being used to promote a
theatrical exhibition or an athletic event.' The purpose behind this con-
gressional grant of protection was to assure that the USOC would retain
the exclusive use of these words to promote its world-wide athletic
competitions.7
This exclusive-use right granted to the USOC is more protective
than an ordinary trademark,8 as ordinary trademark defenses9 are inap-
5. Id. § 380(a)(4). Specifically, the statute provides:
(a) Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose of
trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibi-
tion, athletic performance, or competition-
(4) the words "Olympic", "Olympiad", "Citius Altius Fortius", or any combina-
tion or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or
to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic activity; shall be
subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies provided in the [Fed-
eral Trademark Act of 1946].
Id.
6. Id. § 380(a)(4). See supra note 5 for pertinent text of the statute.
7. "The fundamental purpose of [the Amateur Sports Act of 1978] was to safeguard the
USOC's ability to raise the financial resources that are a critical component of America's ca-
pacity to send world-class amateur athletes into international competition without the massive
government subsidies enjoyed by competitors from other nations. United States Olympic
Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
8. The Federal Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987), defines trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others." Id. § 1127 (1982).
It is commonly accepted that:
In general, trademarks perform four functions which are deserving of protection
in the courts: (1) to identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold
by others; (2) to signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from a single,
albeit anonymous, source; (3) to signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of
an equal level of quality; and (4) as a prime instrument in advertising and selling the
goods.
1 J.T. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:1(B) (2d ed. 1984) (cita-
tions omitted).
9. For example, in an ordinary trademark infringement action, a plaintiff must prove "a
likelihood of confusion." "' Likelihood of Confusion' is the basic test of both common-law...
and federal statutory trademark infringement." 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, at § 23:1
(citations omitted). Confusion means that the defendant's goods or services are likely to be
confused with the plaintiff's goods or services because of the defendant's use of the trademark.
Confusion can be found through phonetic similarity, see, eg., Coca-Cola Co. v. Clay, 324 F.2d
198 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ("Cup-O'-Cola" held confusingly similar to "Coca-Cola"), visual similar-
ity, see, eg., Application of Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (water droplet char-
acters held confusingly similar), or meaning to consumer, see, eg., National Ass'n of Blue
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plicable in an infringement suit brought by the USOC. 10 Practically, this
exclusive-use right prohibits any use of the word "Olympic" in a promo-
tional context without the USOC's permission: Such an unpermitted use
is an infringement of the USOC's exclusive right and allows the USOC to
sue civilly for injunctive relief as well as for damages.11
Although the federal government created the USOC and gave it an
exclusive-use right in the word "Olympic," the Supreme Court of the
United States decided in 1987, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee,12 that the USOC is a private entity
and therefore, is not subject to the constitutional restraints applicable to
a government entity. 13 Thus, the USOC is free to exercise its exclusive
intellectual property right in the word "Olympic" unhindered by the re-
straints imposed on federal governmental actors by the fifth amendment.
The practical effect of this holding allows the USOC to make unre-
strained decisions as to which groups will be permitted to use the word
"Olympic" in their organizational activities. By labeling the USOC a
private entity and thus, not subjecting the USOC to constitutional re-
strictions, the Court has in effect completely insulated the USOC's licens-
ing actions from judicial review on constitutional grounds.
This Note considers, against the backdrop of established Supreme
Court state action doctrine,.4 the Court's holding that the USOC is a
private entity. It then examines whether the Supreme Court's reasoning
Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1966) (Red Cross medical
insurance held confusingly similar to Blue Shield medical insurance).
For an exhaustive explanation of confusion, see generally 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note
8, at § 23.
10. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2977-78 (1987) [San Francisco II].
11. 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1982) provides that any infringement is subject to the remedies avail-
able in the Federal Trademark Act of 1946. The remedies provided by the Federal Trademark
Act are: (1) injunctive relief; (2) profits; (3) damages; (4) attorney fee's in "exceptional cases";
and (5) costs. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1982).
12. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
13. Id. at 2984-87.
14. "State action" was first defined in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where the
Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination
based on race in public accomodations. Id. at 25. The Court interpreted the fourteenth
amendment to prevent only discrimination by the government and not private parties. Id. at
11. The Court supported its interpretation using the language of the amendment itself. Id.
The amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Court stated that "[i]t is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
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is consistent with previously articulated state action principles. Finally,
this Note examines the Supreme Court's most recent state action case to
explore current Supreme Court standards for state action analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
To better understand and evaluate the Supreme Court's treatment of
state action in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee,"5 this section provides a brief overview of the
Olympic Games and the USOC.
The modem day Olympics are a revival of the ancient Olympic
Games which began in Olympia, Greece in 776 B.C. 16 These original
games were held every four years and consisted of only one competition:
a foot race. 17 As a prize, the winner of this contest was awarded a simple
olive wreath.'" As the games continued, however, prizes became more
elaborate and athletic events such as boxing and wrestling were added.19
Eventually, in 394 A.D., Emperor Theodosius I of Greece banned the
Olympic Games because increased competitiveness induced bribery,
scandal and corruption.20
Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France was responsible for the mod-
em-day revival of the ancient Olympic Games.2 Inspired by the uncor-
rupted games of early Greece, Coubertin believed that a world-wide
athletic competition would promote international goodwill.22 In 1892,
he announced his plan to bring back the Olympic Games.23 Part of
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment." Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).
Thus, in order to find a violation of constitutional rights, the actor must be the govern-
ment. With the exception of the thirteenth amendment and the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Constitution does not recognize individual invasion of
rights, only constitutional violations by "state action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1688 n.1 (2d ed. 1988).
"State action" can be on a state level or a federal level. For purposes of equal protection,
the fifth amendment imposes upon the federal government essentially the same limitations as
the fourteenth amendment imposes upon the states. See infra note 67 for further discussion of
the Court's application of equal protection to the federal government through the fifth
amendment.
15. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) [San Francisco II].
16. D. WALLECHINSKY, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF THE OLYMPICS xvii (1984).
17. Id. The foot race was a sprint. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also J. KIERAN & A. DALEY, THE STORY OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 16-17
(1969).
21. B. HENRY & P. YEOMANS, supra note 1, at 462.
22. J. KIERAN & A. DALEY, supra note 20, at 19.
23. D. WALLECHINSKY, supra note 16.
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Coubertin's efforts included forming the International Olympic Commit-
tee (Committee), a body that still exists today, operating out of Lau-
sanne, Switzerland. 4
The Committee is responsible for the rules and policies governing
the Olympic Games which are held every four years.25 This body selects
the host city for each Olympic Games and participates in the overall
negotiations for, and organization of, the Olympics.
2 6
Additionally, the Committee is charged with establishing eligibility
rules to determine which countries' athletes may participate in the
Olympic Games.27 The Committee's coordinating duties are simplified
by recognizing one national Olympic committee in each participating
country.28 In the United States, this body is the USOC.
2 9
Created as an unincorporated entity in 1921, the USOC coordinates
the team that represents the United States in the Olympic Games. ° The
USOC is also responsible for entering athletes in the international ath-
letic competition.31 Thus, an American athlete wishing to participate in
the Olympic Games must be approved and entered into the competition
by the USOC.
3 2
In 1950, Congress gave the USOC its first corporate charter."3 In
1978, Congress, by enacting the ASA, 4 provided the USOC with specific
corporate goals and purposes, thus directing the Olympic movement
within the United States. 5 As previously noted, 6 other statutory provi-
sions gave the USOC the exclusive-use right of the word "Olympic" and
related terms.3 7 Through this statutory grant, Congress sought to allow
the USOC to raise funds by licensing the use of the word "Olympic" to
private industry."
24. B. HENRY & P. YEOMANS, supra note 1, at 462.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 463.
29. Id.
30. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2979-80 & n. 11.
31. See 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(3) (1982) (enabling USOC to control representation of United
States in Olympic Games).
32. Id.; see also id. § 375(a)(1) (enabling USOC to serve as representative to Olympic
Games).
33. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2980 n.ll.
34. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396.
35. See 36 U.S.C. § 374. See supra note 4 for pertinent text of the statute.
36. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
37. 36 U.S.C. § 380(a)(4). See supra note 5 for pertinent text of the statute.
38. "The fundamental purpose of [the] Act was to safeguard the USOC's ability to raise
the financial resources that are a critical component of America's capacity to send world-class
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The ASA also requires the USOC to provide the executive and legis-
lative branches of the federal government with a detailed financial ac-
counting of the USOC's expenditures each year.39 Beyond this
supervisory function, the Amateur Sports Act empowers the Secretary of
Commerce to award grants totalling sixteen million dollars to the USOC
in an effort to promote amateur athletics.4° Accounting reports of the
grant expenditures must also be presented by the USOC to Congress
each year.41
In short, the federal government's involvement with the USOC is
substantial and pervasive: Through statutes, Congress created the USOC
and provided it with goals and purposes;42 the USOC's rights and powers
are derived from congressional legislative action;43 the government
monitors the fiscal affairs of the USOC;4 and the Commerce Depart-
ment has granted the USOC sixteen million dollars in federal funds.4"
amateur athletes into international competition without the massive government subsidies en-
joyed by competitors from other nations." United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp.,
737 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); see also United States Olympic
Comm. v. International Fed'n of Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353, 355 (D.D.C. 1982)
("[the USOC's] funds primarily come from the private sector").
In the district court, the "USOC submitted evidence that it derives the bulk of its funds
from private donations and licensing of the 'Olympic' name and emblem, with licenses raising
$40 million in [a] four-year cycle." Brief for Respondents at 5, San Francisco I1, 107 S. Ct. at
2971 (No. 86-270).
39. 36 U.S.C. § 382a(a). The pertinent portion of the statute states:
The [USOC] shall, on or before the first day of June in each year, transmit simultane-
ously to the President and to each House of Congress a detailed report of its opera-
tions for the preceding calendar year, including a full and complete statement of its
receipts and expenditures.., of the [USOC] during the preceding year.
Id.
40. Id. § 384(a). The statute states: "The Secretary of Commerce ... is authorized to
award grants to the United States Olympic Committee ... to assist in the development of
amateur athletics in the United States.... The Secretary may... award grants to the [USOC]
in a total sum not exceeding $16,000,000 .... " Id.
41. Id. § 384(b). The statute states:
The [USOC] shall... transmit to the Congress a report which shall include a de-
tailed accounting of the funds made available to the [USOC] by the Secretary pursu-
ant to subsection (a) of this section and a comprehensive description of those projects
which the [USOC] anticipates it will finance during the next fiscal year with funds
authorized by this section.
Id.
42. Id. § 374. See supra note 4 for pertinent text of the statute.
43. See, ag., 36 U.S.C. § 375 (defining powers of USOC).
44. See id § 382a(a); see supra note 39 for pertinent text of the statute (fiscal affair supervi-
sion). See 36 U.S.C. § 384(b); see supra note 41 for pertinent text of the statute (grant expendi-
ture reporting).
45. See 36 U.S.C. § 384(a); see also supra note 40 for pertinent text of the statute (grant
provision).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
In 1981, a group of individuals sought to incorporate in California
under the name "Golden Gate Olympic Association. ' 46 The California
Department of Corporations instructed the association that the word
"Olympic" was unavailable for use in a corporate title.47 Consequently,
the group incorporated under its current name, San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), and began to promote the "Gay Olympic
Games" by using the title on its letterhead, mailings and in advertise-
ments in local newspapers.48
The "Gay Olympic Games" (Games) were to be a nine day athletic
competition in San Francisco during August, 1982. 41 The promoters'
purpose in staging the event was "to combat homophobia and to work
for the health and tolerance of gay and lesbian persons."50 SFAA ex-
pected that athletes from cities all over the world would participate in the
athletic competitions. The Games were scheduled to open with a cere-
mony in San Francisco's Kezar Stadium.5' The ceremony was to begin
with the lighting of a "Gay Olympic Flame," followed by a parade of the
competing athletes marching behind the flags of their respective cities.5 2
The actual athletic competition was to feature eighteen different events,
46. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2975 (1987) [San Francisco II].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. International Olympic Comm. v. San FranciscoArts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1320
(9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc). "Homophobia" is an
exaggerated, inexplicable and illogical fear of homosexuals. See WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 862 (1977).
Other purposes of the Gay Olympic Games included:
"I) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed minority.
2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable characterization
of gay men and women.
3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual assimi-
lation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to diminish the
ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communities regardless of sexual
orientation.
[SFAA's expectations] were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to the
event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of 'serious fun' would create a
climate of friendship and co-operation[,] false images and misconceptions about gay
people would decline as a result of a particpatory [sic] educational process, and bene-
fit ALI: communities."
San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2980 n.13 (quoting Joint Appendix at 93-94) (emphasis in
original).
51. Id. at 2975.
52. Id.
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with the winners of each event being awarded gold, silver or bronze med-
als.13 To fund the event, SFAA sold merchandise such as bumper stick-
ers, buttons and T-shirts bearing the title "Gay Olympic Games."54
In December of 1981, the USOC notified SFAA that under the Am-
ateur Sports Act of 1978,11 the USOC had an exclusive right to use the
word "Olympic" in promoting athletic contests.16  It then directed
SFAA to terminate its use of the word in promoting its athletic competi-
tion. 7 SFAA initially agreed to comply with this request, but later re-
sumed unauthorized use of the word 8 on the ground that it had a
constitutional right to do so. 9
Upon discovering the continued unauthorized use of the word, the
USOC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California to enjoin SFAA's use of the word.' The USOC
claimed that under the ASA, any use of the word "Olympic" in a promo-
tional context violated the USOC's exclusive-use right.6 '
After a hearing, the district court granted the USOC a temporary
restraining order. 2 A preliminary injunction was then granted after an
additional hearing. 63 SFAA appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit,' which upheld the preliminary injunction.6
After discovery, the district court then granted summary judgment and a
permanent injunction in favor of the USOC.6 6 SFAA again sought re-
view in the Ninth Circuit.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1982).
56. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2976.
59. Brief for Respondents at 5, San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270). SFAA
based its right on the first amendment. Id. For a summary of SFAA's first amendment argu-
ment in the Supreme Court, see infra note 81.
60. San Francisco I, 107 S. Ct. at 2976.
61. Id.
62. Brief for Respondents at 5, San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270).
63. Id. This is the only reported opinion at the district court level. International Olympic
Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd,
707 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983), permanent injunction aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd
sub nom. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971 (1987).
64. Brief for Respondents at 7, San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270).
65. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 707 F.2d 517 (9th
Cir. 1983), permanent injunction aff'd, 781 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom. San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
66. Brief for Respondents at 8, San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270).
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B. The Reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
In the court of appeals, SFAA contended that enforcement of the
Amateur Sports Act against the SFAA violated the equal protection
component of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.67
Specifically, SFAA asserted that in denying SFAA the use of the word
"Olympic," the USOC had unconstitutionally discriminated against the
SFAA because the group consisted mainly of homosexuals.68 In support
of this allegation, SFAA cited "numerous other competitive games ad-
vertised as 'Olympics' "69 upon which the USOC had failed to take any
legal action.70 As of August of 1982, these competitions included the:
International Police Olympics; Armenian Olympics; Olympic
of Ballet; Olympics of the Mind; Senior Olympics; Golden
Olympics; Firemens Olympics; United States Skill Olympics;
Virginia Golden Olympics; Wrist-Wrestling Olympics; Crab-
Cooking Olympics; Dog Olympics; Nude Olympics; Rat Olym-
pics; WackyOlympics; Xerox Olympics; [and] Alcoholic
Olympics.7'
67. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 736
(9th Cir. 1986) [San Francisco I], aff'd sub nom. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
Although there is no express provision in the fifth amendment that constitutes an equal
protection clause, the Supreme Court reads one into the amendment. The equal protection
clause is thus implied through the due process clause. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (desegration of public schools in District of Columbia dictated by due process clause of
fifth amendment); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (District of Columbia's
police officer application test alleged to violate due process clause of fifth amendment).
68. San Francisco I, 781 F.2d at 736.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Petitioners at 8, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 86-270) [San Francisco 1I].
The USOC sought to distinguish these cases by explaining that SFAA's use would "most
likely affect the value of the term 'Olympic."' Brief for Respondents at 42, San Francisco II,
107 S. Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270).
Additionally, the USOC asserted that the "Crab-Cooking Olympics" and "Dog Olym-
pics" were not "serious athletic contests, but rather are essentially shows." Id. at 41. The
USOC did not, however, distinguish any of the other contests cited by SFAA.
Moreover, the USOC added that "[the USOC] has no vendetta against [SFAA] or anyone
else. In fact, when [SFAA] at first agreed voluntarily to drop the word 'Olympic,'... [the
USOC's] executive director thanked them and wished them success in their event." Id. at 42
n.60.
The only uses the USOC has expressly authorized in the area of athletic competitions are
the "Special Olympics" (for the mentally disabled), the "Junior Olympics" and the "Explorer
Olympics" (both for youngsters). Brief for Petitioners at 8, San Francisco 11, 107 S. Ct. at
2971 (No. 86-270). The authorization for the handicapped complies with one of the goals
Congress established for the Committee. See 36 U.S.C. § 374(13) (1982).
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The Ninth Circuit, however, never reached the merits of SFAA's equal
protection claim. The court held that the USOC was a private entity and
was therefore not subject to the restraints of the Constitution.72
SFAA had urged the court that judicial enforcement of the USOC's
exclusive-use right constituted sufficient involvement by the government
to trigger the guarantees of the Constitution.73 SFAA relied on Shelley v.
Kraemer74 where the Supreme Court of the United States held that state
court enforcement of restrictive racial covenants in real property titles
constituted state action and thus violated the fourteenth amendment. 7
In response, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Shelley governs only where
a court intervenes between private parties so as to somehow benefit the
state.76 Mere governmental enforcement of private rights, it said, will
not trigger the protections of the Constitution.77
Finding that the USOC was not a state actor, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to reach the merits of SFAA's equal protection claim. After the
Ninth Circuit denied SFAA's petition for a rehearing en banc, 78 SFAA
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.
IV. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted the writ79 but affirmed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit.80 Significantly, the Court agreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit that the USOC was not a state actor, and as such was not subject to
72. San Francisco 1, 781 F.2d at 736-37.
73. Id. at 737.
74. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
75. Id. at 20.
76. San Francisco I, 781 F.2d at 737. The court cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). But see infra notes 113-30, 177-93 and accompanying text for
contrary arguments that (1) the court inaccurately characterized the holding of Burton; and
(2) the government is not merely an intermediary between two private parties. For further
discussion of Burton, see infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
77. San Francisco I, 781 F.2d at 737.
78. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1320
(9th Cir. 1986).
79. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 312
(1986).
80. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971
(1987) [San Francisco II]. The majoiity opinion was written by Justice Powell. Justice Powell
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens and Scalia. Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor dissented from the majority in the finding that the respondents were not
state actors. Id. at 2987 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Breman filed a dissenting opinion that Justice Marshall joined. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the dissent, see infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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the restraints of the Constitution. Thus, it too avoided having to con-
sider SFAA's equal protection claim."
The Justices examined the USOC to determine whether it was a
state actor and therefore bound by the Constitution. Although Congress
granted the USOC a corporate charter,82 this factor alone did not propel
the USOC into state actor status.8 3 The Court noted that all corpora-
tions receive their corporate charters from some government, usually a
state, and that such limited involvement by the government has never
been sufficient by itself to transform a corporation into a state actor.
8 4
Further, the Court reaffirmed that even heavy regulation by the govern-
ment does not constitute sufficient state involvement to make the regu-
lated entity a state actor.8 5
The Court also held that although Congress gave the USOC an ex-
clusive-use right in the word "Olympic" and related terms, such power
did not render the USOC a state actor.86 The Court reasoned that while
all trademark rights are given by governmental acts, the private actions
of trademark holders have not been regarded as governmental acts.
8 7
Moreover, the Court stated that although Congress intended to help the
81. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2986-87. SFAA asserted that the USOC had sought to
prevent SFAA from using the word "Olympic" solely because the USOC disapproved of
SFAA's largely homosexual membership. Brief for Petitioner at 10, San Francisco II, 107 S.
Ct. at 2971 (No. 86-270).
In addition to SFAA's state action claim, SFAA argued that it should be able to assert
trademark defenses against the USOC. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2976. The Court re-
jected SFAA's claim. In considering 36 U.S.C. § 380(a)(4), the Court relied on the plain lan-
guage of the statute, which forbids any person from using the word "Olympic," regardless of
its non-confusing use. Id. at 2977; see supra note 5 for pertinent text of the statute. Further,
the "legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to provide the USOC with exclu-
sive control of the use of the word 'Olympic' without regard to whether an unauthorized use of
the word tends to cause confusion." San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2977.
Also, SFAA contended that the first amendment prevented the USOC from holding this
exclusive-use right in the word "Olympic." Id. at 2978. The Court found SFAA's argument
unpersuasive. "Because Congress reasonably could conclude that the USOC has distinguished
the word 'Olympic' through its own efforts, Congress' decision to grant the USOC a limited
property right in the word 'Olympic' falls within the scope of trademark law protections, and
thus certainly within constitutional bounds." Id. at 2980. Also, "[e]ven though this protection
may exceed the traditional rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the applica-
tion of the [Amateur Sports] Act to this commercial speech is not broader than necessary to
protect the legitimate congressional interest and therefore does not violate the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 2983.
82. 36 U.S.C. § 371-372 (1982).
83. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2985.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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USOC with funding,88 that fact did not make the USOC a governmental
entity.
8 9
Moreover, the Court recognized that a private entity will be consid-
ered a state actor where the private entity is performing what has tradi-
tionally been an exclusive governmental function. 90 While the USOC
performs actions that are of national interest and serves the general pub-
lic, the Court concluded that the administration of amateur sports con-
tests is not a traditional governmental function.91
The Court agreed that the government can be held answerable for
the decisions of a private entity when the government has coerced or
substantially encouraged the private entity to make a certain decision. 92
However, SFAA could not prevail on this argument, either, for the gov-
ernment had not been responsible for the USOC's decision to preclude
SFAA from using the word "Olympic." 93 The only federal involvement
the Court perceived was a possible failure to supervise the USOC, but
such passive acquiescence would not suffice to make the actions of the
USOC governmental in nature.94
Thus, the Court held that the USOC was not a state actor, and that
it was therefore not subject to the Constitution. 95 Accordingly, the
Court did not reach SFAA's fifth amendment equal protection claim.
96
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court relied on Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), and Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) for this proposition. In Rendell-Baker, the Court rejected a
claim by discharged personnel of a private school that government regulation and public fund-
ing made the school a state actor. 457 U.S. at 840-42.
In Blum, Medicaid patients in a nursing home challenged the decisions of the nursing
home in transferring or discharging the patients without notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 457 U.S. at 993. The Court found that although the home was extensively regulated,
there was not a close nexus between the regulations and the challenged action. Id. at 1004.
Additionally, the Court found no governmental coercion in the decisions made by the nursing
home. Id. Finally, the Court held that providing nursing home services was not traditionally
associated with sovereignty. Id. at 1005. Thus, the Court rejected the patients' claim that the
home was a state actor. Id.
90. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2985. It can be argued that this standard may not be
viable considering the Court's recent ruling in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), where the Court held that it is impossible for courts to define traditional
governmental functions. Indeed, the Court has limited the public function determination in
state action cases. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (function
exclusively performed by the government); see also infra text accompanying notes 131-58 for
further discussion of the public function test for state action.
91. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2985.
92. Id. at 2986.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2984-87.
96. Id. at 2986-87.
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B. The Dissenting Opinions
Four Justices dissented, 97 believing that the USOC did qualify as a
state actor.98 Justices O'Connor and Blackmun agreed with the major-
ity's rejection of SFAA's other claims,99 but would have remanded the
case for a determination of the claim of discrimination."c° Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justice Marshall,10 1 disagreed with the majority on all
counts 102 and would likewise have remanded the case for a determination
of whether SFAA's discrimination claim was valid.103
All dissenting Justices found the USOC to be a state actor under
Justice Brennan's "symbiotic relationship" analysis,"° while Justices
Brennan and Marshall also relied on the "public function" test.'05 Jus-
tice Brennan asserted that under either of these previously articulated
Supreme Court tests, the USOC was a state actor.10 6 Thus, four mem-
bers of the Court agreed that the USOC was a state actor and that the
case should have been remanded for a determination of SFAA's discrimi-
nation claim.'
0 7
V. ANALYSIS
Precedent in the area of state action has been conflicting and confus-
ing.'08 The Court has often established state action to exist in a certain
97. The four Justices were Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor. San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2987 (1987) [San
Francisco II] (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
98. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
99. See supra note 81 for a summary of SFAA's other claims.
100. San Francisco II, 107 S. CL 2987 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
101. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2987 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with SFAA that the
exclusive-use right violated the first amendment. See supra note 81 for a brief discussion of
SFAA's claims. The Justice based his first amendment analysis on the overbreadth doctrine
and discriminatory regulation of expression. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2994-99 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2991-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the symbiotic relationship test.
105. Id. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 131-58 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the public function test.
106. Id. at 2987-93.
107. Id. at 2987 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at
2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. "There still are no clear principles for determining whether state action exists. As
Judge Friendly recently observed, the statement fifteen years ago that the 'state action cases
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situation, only to later limit its effect.10 9 From this precedent, the Court
has created a labyrinth that can support any decision the Court may de-
sire to reach. This decision-making process results in the Court's failure
to articulate and adhere to concrete state action requirements, making a
plaintiff's burden of proving state action nearly impossible to meet. The
decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee 11o demonstrates that the Court has begun a retreat from its
nearly insurmountable state action test. This is ironic considering the
result in the case.
This section examines the USOC and analyzes the Court's decision
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics under the most recent state actidn test
articulated by the Court. By examining the Court's analysis of state ac-
tion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics and the Court's most recent state
action decision,11 the Court's discomfort with the stringent test for state
action will become clear. Finally, the Author proposes that the Court
should continue its trend in making state action a reality for plaintiffs
instead of a legal fiction.
A. State Action Standards
To analyze the Court's decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,I 2 the Court's previously estab-
lished state action tests must be reviewed. This section therefore sets
forth the standards that the Supreme Court has used to determine when
state action exists.
1. The symbiotic relationship test
In 1961, the Court found state action to exist when the state was
significantly involved with a "private entity." ' In Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority,"4 a state agency leased some commercial space in
were a "conceptual disaster area"' ... would appear even more apt today." Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 504 (1985) (quoting Friendly, The Public-
Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. RFv. 1289, 1290 (1982) (citing Black,
Foreward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L.
REv. 69, 70 (1967)) (footnote omitted).
109. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (mere traditional public function)
with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (public function that tradition-
ally has been exclusively reserved to the sovereign).
110. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) [San Francisco 11].
111. West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
112. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) [San Francisco I].
113. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
114. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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a state-owned parking garage to a coffee shop operator.115 The coffee
shop refused to serve the plaintiff on the basis of his race. 116 The plaintiff
sued in state court for declaratory and injunctive relief. 17 The Supreme
Court of Delaware dismissed Burton's complaint, holding that the coffee
shop was a private entity and as such, its activities were not restricted by
the Constitution. 18
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that
"[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true signifi-
cance."' 19 The Court noted that there were mutual benefits present be-
tween the government and the coffee shop owner under the lease
agreement.12° While the building and land were publicly owned, 121 the
leased premises "constituted a physically and financially integral and, in-
deed, indispensible part of the State's plan to operate its [parking] project
as a self-sustaining unit." 122 Further, the state advanced funds for the
repair and maintance of the building.'23 The coffee shop also increased
the value of the state's realty by adding fixtures and creating customers
for the parking gargage.124 Additionally, the Court noted that the build-
ing that housed the coffee shop appeared to be public in character.
125
Official government signs were posted on the structure while state and
federal flags flew from the roof.
126
The Supreme Court held that the coffee shop was a state actor.1
27
The Court claimed that when the government is significantly involved in
a mutually beneficial relationship with a private entity, that entity's con-
duct is limited by constitutional boundaries.
128
115. Id. at 719.
116. Id. at 716.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 724. "It cannot be doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the
parking facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits."
Id.
121. Id. at 723.
122. Id. at 723-24.
123. Id. at 724.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 720.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 725.
128. Id. at 724.
It is irony amounting to grave injustice that in one part of a single building, erected
and maintained with public funds by an agency of the State to serve a public purpose,
all persons have equal rights, while in another portion, also serving the public, a
Negro is a second-class citizen, offensive because of his race, without rights and
January 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The Burton case represents the notion that a private entity could be
so intertwined with the state that it would become a state actor.
129
Where the state has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [a private entity] ... it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity." 130 Thus, under Burton, a seemingly private en-
tity's actions could constitute state action where the entity and the gov-
ernment have a mutually beneficial dependent relationship.
2. The public function test
In addition to Burton's symbiotic relationship test, the Supreme
Court has found state action when a private entity performs a traditional
public function."3 For example, in Evans v. Newton,'32 decided in 1966,
the Court held that a private park, due to its municipal nature and public
function, was a state entity whose actions were limited by the Constitu-
tion.1 33 In Evans, a United States Senator devised a plot of land to the
Mayor and City of Macon, Georgia to be used as a park for "whites
only." '134 The city acted as trustee for the park but soon sought to re-
move itself, acknowledging that it could not act in a discriminatory man-
ner. 35 Several black citizens intervened, asking that the court refuse to
appoint private trustees, as requested by the city, alleging that racial seg-
regation was unconstitutional and against the public policy of the United
States. 136
The Supreme Court of Georgia denied the relief requested by the
black citizens. 137 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. It
was clear to the Court that "when private individuals or groups are en-
dowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature,
they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its
constitutional limitations."
1 38
The Court held that the municipal character of the park, coupled
unentitled to service, but at the same time fully enjoys equal access to nearby restau-
rants in wholly privately owned buildings.
Id. at 724-25.
129. Id. at 725.
130. Id.
131. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 509 (1946).
132. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
133. Id. at 301.
134. Id. at 297.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 298.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 299.
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with the city's control over it, subjected the park's operation to the re-
straints of the Constitution even if operated by private parties. 3 9 The
park's public character required that it be treated as a public institution,
subject to the prohibitions contained in the Constitution, regardless of
who held title to the land."4°
The proposition that private entities may be treated as state actors
was not unique to Evans. In Marsh v. Alabama,'4' decided in 1946, the
Supreme Court held that exclusive property rights must sometimes yield
to first amendment rights where a public function is being performed. 42
In Marsh, a private corporation owned a town in Alabama that was eas-
ly and freely accessible to all members of the public. 43 The town prose-
cuted a Jehovah's Witness for disseminating religious materials on the
corporate property. 44
The Supreme Court struck down the state court criminal trespass
conviction, noting that people who lived in or visited a company town
could not be denied their freedom of speech or religion merely because
the property was held by a private actor. 45  The Court held that
"[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion."' 146 The Court
noted that "the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and
railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since
these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and
since their operation is essentially a public function, it is [sic] subject to
state regulation."' 47 Thus, the Court noted that although facilities are
private, they could be subject to constitutional restrictions in certain
situations.
148
The Marsh Court explained that the company was performing a
public function by running the town.' 49 It stated that "[w]hen [the
Court] balance[s] the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion ... the latter
occupy a preferred position."' 50 Thus, where a seemingly private entity
139. Id. at 301-02.
140. Id. at 302.
141. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
142. Id. at 509.
143. Id. at 503.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 509.
146. Id. at 506.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 507. Thus, running a town is a traditional public function. Id.
150. Id. at 509.
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was performing traditional governmental functions, state action would be
found to exist. -
Subsequent to Marsh, the Court narrowed the public function test
drastically."'1 In addition to requiring that the activity performed by the
entity be a traditional public function, the Court began requiring an ele-
ment of exclusivity.' 52 Thus, the public function test could be met only if
the entity was performing an activity that traditionally had been exclu-
sively reserved to the state.153 For example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.,"' a private utility company, extensively regulated by the
state, did not have to provide a customer with procedural due process
protections before her electrical services were terminated.' The Court
reasoned that the utility was not a state actor because providing electrical
service was not a function "traditionally [and exclusively] associated with
sovereignty."' 56 Although the utility was required by state statute to
provide customers with electricity, arguably a public function, the guar-
antees of the Constitution did not apply because the utility was not per-
forming an exclusive sovereign function.157 Under this narrowed view of
the public function test, state action existed only when an entity's func-
tion was normally performed solely by the sovereign.' 58
3. Lugar's refinement of the state action test
In 1982, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,' 9 the Supreme Court fur-
ther redefined the state action test. The Court set forth a concrete, two-
part formula to be used in determining whether the actions of a private
entity could be labeled state action.' 60
Lugar, a truckstop operator, was sued in Virginia state court by his
creditor/supplier, Edmondson Oil Company.' 6' Before commencement
of that action, Edmondson was granted prejudgment attachment of
151. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see also Flagg Bros., Inc.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
152. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (public function must have been "traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State").
153. Id.
154. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
155. Id. at 358-59.
156. Id. at 353.
157. Id.
158. The narrow view taken by the Court now makes it extremely difficult to use this the-
ory. The Court has specified that elections, education, fire and police protection and tax col-
lection are probably the only functions which traditionally have been exclusively reserved to
the government. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-64.
159. 45,7 U.S. 922 (1982).
160. Id. at 937.
161. Id. at 924.
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Lugar's property in an ex parte hearing. 162 Edmondson had alleged that
Lugar might dispose of the property to defeat any judgment against
him. 163 Lugar then brought suit in federal court against Edmondson Oil
and its president, alleging that the defendants acted jointly with the state
and deprived Lugar of due process as required by the fourteenth amend-
ment.'" The district court held that Lugar failed to state a valid claim
for relief as Edmondson Oil was not a state actor.1 65 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.166
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that private
parties engage in state action when: (1) the party depriving persons of a
constitutional right can be labeled a state actor; and (2) the deprivation
of a constitutional right is accomplished under color of state law or a
privilege created by the government. 67 Thus, under Lugar, the Court
will find state action where the questioned conduct is undertaken by a
state actor, acting pursuant to a right or duty created by the government.
The Lugar Court stated that to meet the first part of the test-
whether the entity is a state actor-previously articulated state action
tests, such as Evans' public function test or Burton's symbiotic relation-
ship test, could be used.' 68 Lugar thus did not overrule the previous
state action tests, but simply added an additional requirement to the
analysis. According to Lugar, the previous state action tests only estab-
lish whether the seemingly private entity is a state actor. 169 Therefore, to
find state action, the second part of the Lugar test must be satisfied as
well.
The second part of the Lugar analysis requires that the state actor
operate pursuant to a state law or privilege. 170 In Lugar, this require-
ment was met because Edmondson Oil invoked a prejudgment attach-
ment procedure which had been established by state law.' 7 1 Thus, there
was a direct relationship between the deprivation of Lugar's procedural
due process rights and a government created privilege.
The Court concluded that Edmondson Oil was a state actor who
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 925.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 937.
168. Id. at 939.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 937.
171. Id. at 941.
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had acted pursuant to a privilege created by the government. 172 Hence,
Edmondson Oil's conduct was deemed to constitute state action.
B. Current State Action Standards Applied To San Francisco
Arts & Athletics
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee, 7 3 the Supreme Court appears to have reached the correct
result regarding state action, but for incorrect reasons. This section ana-
lyzes the USOC under the state action test articulated in Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co. 174 and evaluates the Court's skewed analysis in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics. Instead of twisting precedent to find no state
actor, the Court should have relied on part two of the Lugar test to dis-
miss SFAA's discrimination claim.
1. State actor requirement
Part one of the Lugar test for determining state action requires that
the alleged unconstitutional conduct involve a state actor. 175 Employing
the reasoning of the Lugar Court, this requirement can be met through
the "symbiotic relationship," "public function," or other state action
tests. 
176
a. Burton's symbiotic relationship test
Under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,17 7 a private entity is
found to be a state actor where the government and a seemingly private
entity have a mutually beneficial relationship. 178 In San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, the USOC and the government had a symbiotic relationship
which should have been deemed to satisfy this test.
First, Congress has conferred many benefits on the USOC. The
USOC owes its very existence to Congress.1 79 Federal statutes prescribe
the purposes and goals of the USOC,18 ° as well as preclude any internal
172. Id. at 941-42. Edmondson Oil Company was found to be a state actor under a state
compulsion theory. Id. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), for an illustra-
tion of the joint participant theory.
173. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) [San Francisco II].
174. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
175. Id.
176. For a discussion of the "symbiotic relationship" test and the "public function" test, see
supra notes 113-58 and accompanying text.
177. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
178. Id. at 723-24.
179. 36 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) actually created the USOC.
180. Id. § 374. See supra note 4 for pertinent text of the statute.
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changes without notice and comment pursuant to administrative
procedures. 181
Beyond giving life to the USOC, Congress also conferred sustenance
upon it. Primarily, the government gave the Committee its valuable ex-
clusive-use right to the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," and "Citus Al-
tius Fortius."'182 Further, the USOC is endowed with remedies against
parties who combine or simulate the protected words in a manner that is
likely to cause confusion.' 83 Although this privilege is not pecuniary, it
allows the USOC to raise substantial amounts of money through imple-
menting licensing and marketing plans with private industry.' 84 While
public donations are accepted by the USOC, the licensing of the pro-
tected words is the only active way the USOC may raise money.'85
Thus, the substantial livelihood of the USOC was granted by the
government.
Congress also supervises the Committee's finances. Although the
USOC has never requested a grant, federal funding totalling sixteen mil-
lion dollars is available to the USOC. 186  The ASA also requires the
181. 36 U.S.C. § 375(b) provides in pertinent part that:
The [USOC] shall adopt and may amend a constitution and bylaws not inconsistent
with the laws of the United States or of any State, except that the [USOC] may
amend its constitution only if it-
(1) publishes in its principal publication a general notice of the proposed alteration
of the constitution .... the time and place of the [USOC's] regular meeting at which
the alteration is to be decided, and a provision informing interested persons that they
may submit materials as authorized in paragraph (2); and
(2) gives to all interested persons, prior to the adoption of any amendment, an op-
portunity to submit written data, views, or arguments concerning the proposed
amendment for a period of at least 60 days after the date of publication of the notice.
Id.
182. Id. § 380(a)(4). See supra note 5 for pertinent text of the statute.
183. See, eg., United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 267 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
184. Id. at 264 (fundamental purpose of ASA is to allow USOC to raise its own funds).
185. 36 U.S.C. § 380 also allows the USOC to license the Olympic symbol/logo which con-
sists of five interlocking rings in blue, yellow, black, green and red. See also supra note 38 for a
brief discussion of licensing and fund raising by the USOC.
186. 36 U.S.C. § 384(a). See supra note 40 for pertinent text of the statute. Although the
USOC has never actually applied for grants pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 384, the USOC has been
awarded federal monies. In 1980, the USOC received ten million dollars. This was a payment
from the federal government to offset the USOC's losses from the 1980 Moscow Olympic
Games boycott. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2984 n.25.
Congressional dissenters from the approval of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 felt that
the grants to be given to the USOC would constitute government involvement in amateur
athletics. H.R. REP. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-47 (1978). "[I]f we are to involve the
Federal Government in this area and use public funds to subsidize Olympic-related actions, I
feel it is incumbent upon us to take positions consistent with the human rights policies we have
adopted in other international programs." Id. at 45 (dissenting remarks of Rep. Drinan).
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USOC to fie annual reports with Congress. 18 7
Moreover, the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 also confers upon the
USOC the right to perform as the sole representative of the United States
to the International Olympic Committee, the organizing body of the
Olympic Games.1 8  Through this right, the USOC retains the exclusive
power to decide which amateur American athletes will participate in the
Olympic Games.
The government in turn derives valuable benefits from the USOC.
Congress enacted the ASA in response to the disorganized state of ama-
teur athletics in the United States 1 89 The government now has "for the
first time in its history, an exclusive and effective organization to coordi-
nate and administer all amateur athletics related to international compe-
tition, and to represent that program abroad." 190 Strong representation
by the American team in the Olympics reflects well on the nation as a
whole. 191
Further, as in Burton, where the public perception of the entity's
status as a governmental actor was influential in a finding of state ac-
tion, 192 the public perception of the USOC as a governmental actor is
also strong. The USOC appears to be part of the government-it flies the
American flag, uses patriotic insignia, tallies medal winners by nation
and has the national anthem performed when an American athlete wins a
gold medal. These factors overwhelmingly convey the impression that
the USOC and the Olympic team are acting on behalf of the government.
The mutual benefits enjoyed by the government and the USOC
surely meet the test of Burton. Through the ASA, the government "has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the
USOC] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity." 193 By meeting the symbiotic relationship test, the USOC satis-
187. 36 U.S.C. § 382a(a). See supra note 39 for pertinent text of the statute.
188. For additional information on the International Olympic Committee see supra notes
15-41 and accompanying text.
189. H.R. REP. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1978).
190. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2992 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. As has been stated:
Every aspect of the Olympic pageant, from the procession of athletes costumed in
national uniform, to the raising of national flags and the playing of national anthems
at the medal ceremony, to the official tally of medals won by each national team,
reinforces the national significance of Olympic participation. Indeed, it was the per-
ception of shortcomings in the nation's performance that led to the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978.
Id. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
192. Burton, 365 U.S. at 720. See supra notes 113-30 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of Burton.
193. Id. at 725.
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fled the state actor requirement of part one of the Lugar state action test.
b. Evans'public function test
Another way to satisfy part one of the Lugar state action standard is
by meeting the public function test articulated in Evans v. Newton 194 and
Marsh v. Alabama.'95 Although the Court has narrowed the test in sub-
sequent cases, 196 if a seemingly private entity performs an activity that
traditionally has been exclusively reserved to the state, the entity meets
the state actor requirement of Lugar. 1
97
The USOC performs a traditional governmental function normally
reserved to the sovereign. The ASA tacitly gives to the USOC the right
to engage in foreign affairs by allowing the USOC to be the sole represen-
tative of the United States in international athletic activities. The USOC
is responsible for determining which athletes will represent the United
States in the Olympic Games. 198 As Justice Brennan stated, "[a]s the
Olympic Games have grown in international visibility and importance,
the USOC's role as [the United States'] national representative has taken
on increasing significance."'
19 9
The political ramifications of this function are significant. Although
the Games are not intended to be political, in practice they have become
so. For example, in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghani-
stan, the United States boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.2"°
194. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
195. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
196. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); see also Flagg Bros., Inc.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
197. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
198. 36 U.S.C. § 375(a)(3) (1982) states: "The [USOC] shall have the perpetual succession
and power to organize, finance, and control the representation of the United States in the
competitions and events of the Olympic Games... and obtain... amateur representation for
such games."
199. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. D. WALLECHINSKY, supra note 16, at xix.
With his eyes on the upcoming presidential election and his pride on the line, [Presi-
dent] Carter engaged in extensive arm-twisting to get other nations to support the
boycott. Some governments, such as those of Great Britian and Australia, supported
the boycott, but allowed the athletes to decide for themselves if they wanted to go to
Moscow. No such freedom of choice was allowed U.S. athletes, as Carter threatened
to revoke the passport of any athlete who tried to travel to the U.S.S.R.
Id.
The American boycott in 1980 was not the first boycott in the history of the Olympics.
For example, African nations boycotted the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada to
protest a New Zealand rugby team's touring of South Africa. Id. The African Nations de-
manded expulsion of New Zealand from the competition. Id.
Other nations that have boycotted the Olympic Games at various times include: Egypt,
Iraq, Lebanon, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland. Id. at xviii-xix.
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The USOC's decision not to participate in the 1980 Moscow Games was
based on presidential and congressional coercion consisting of threats of
legal action and financial cutbacks.2"' Such interest by Congress and the
President in the Olympic Games demonstrates the substantial impact of
the USOC's actions on foreign policy.2"2
The impact of the Olympics on foreign affairs also is demonstrated
through other recent Olympic Games. Disappointed with the perform-
ance of American athletes in the 1988 Winter Olympic Games in Cal-
gary, Canada, the USOC created an "Overview" committee to improve
the performance of American athletes in future Games.20 3 The chairman
of the new "Overview" committee, George Steinbrenner, characterized
the Olympics as " 'a matter of national and international pride .... The
World Series, the Super Bowl, [have] some international interest, [but
they don't] pit nation against nation the way the Olympics do.' ,2o4 Fur-
ther, before leaving for the 1988 Summer Games in Seoul, Korea, Ameri-
can Olympians were briefed by the State Department and were given a
videotaped blessing by President Reagan.20 5
Additional support for the proposition that the USOC is performing
the traditional sovereign function of foreign affairs and relations can be
found by examining the history of the ASA. Originally, President Ford
established a commission to report on the diminishing performance of
American teams at the Olympic Games. 20 6 The commission recom-
mended the establishment of the USOC as a solution to poor American
performance.20 7 After creating the USOC, Congress has essentially kept
control over it in an attempt to supervise the USOC's important govern-
mental activities. The USOC is required to report to Congress annu-
ally.20 8 Moreover, providing funds to the USOC assures that the USOC
may continue to carry out its important governmental function.
201. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. The Olympic Games often operate as a polical stage fraught with international drama.
"For example, Jesse Owens' dramatic performance in the 1936 Olympic games was widely
perceived as a rebuke to Hitler and Nazism." Id. at 2989 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Addi-
tionally, Justice Brennan, in dissent, noted that "the tragic, politically motivated attack on the
Israeli Olympic Team in 1972, in which 11 Israeli athletes, 5 Arabs, and one German police-
man were killed, forever dispelled any illusion that the Olympics could exist apart from the
violent vicissitudes of international politics." Id. at 2990 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Leave It To George and His Good Old Yankee Know-How, Los Angeles Times, Febru-
ary 25, 1988, § III, at 6, col. 1.
204. Id.
205. Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1988, § II, at 1, col. 1.
206. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2990 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. H.R. RFP. No. 1627, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
208. 36 U.S.C. § 382a(a) (1982). See supra note 39 for pertinent text of the statute.
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As the sole representative of the United States in the area of interna-
tional amateur athletic competitions, the USOC meets the requirements
of the narrowed public function test. The USOC functions as a represen-
tative of the United States to the world community. The USOC's repre-
sentation of the nation is a traditional public function which has
exclusively been reserved to the sovereign. Such a capacity manifestly
mandates finding that the USOC is a state actor and thus satisfies part
one of the Lugar test for state action.
2. Pursuant to a state created privilege requirement
Although the USOC qualifies as a state actor under part one of the
Lugar test, the USOC must also satisfy part two of the test to have its
conduct deemed state action. Part two requires that the private entity
act pursuant to a governmentally created law or privilege.20 9 In Lugar,
the Court specifically noted that to meet part two of the test in a discrim-
ination case, the government must be the source of the decision to dis-
criminate.210 The Court explained that the Lugar test would only be met
if "the decision to discriminate [can] be ascribed to a[ ] governmental
decision. '211 Where the alleged discriminatory policies of an entity are
unrelated to the government decisions that affect that entity, the second
part of the Lugar test is not satisfied.212 Thus, as illustrated by Lugar,
the government rule or privilege must cause the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights.213
This requirement cannot be met by the facts of San Francisco Arts &
Athletics. The government has imposed no rule of conduct upon the
USOC mandating that the USOC discriminate. Congress granted the
USOC the ability to license the word "Olympic" but Congress did not
make any licensing decisions, nor did it provide any guidelines that ar-
guably condoned such alleged discrimination against homosexuals.21 4
The USOC has complete discretion as to whether it will license the
209. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
210. Id. at 938.
211. Id. The Court cited Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where no state action
was found, as an example of this second Lugar requirement in a case involving a discrimina-
tion claim. Lugar, 407 U.S. at 938. In Moose Lodge, a local branch of a fraternal organization
refused to serve a black. 457 U.S. at 164-65. The plaintiff urged that because the state liquor
control board had issued the lodge a liquor license and regulated the entity, the Court must
deem the lodge a state actor. Id. at 171. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim finding that
the state regulation did "not sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory... policies of
Moose Lodge." Id. at 177.
212. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
213. Id. at 937-38.
214. 36 U.S.C. 380(a)(4). See supra note 5 for pertinent text of the statute.
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word "Olympic" to an organization. Neither Congress nor any other
governmental body influences these USOC licensing decisions. The
USOC's decision to forbid SFAA from using the word "Olympic" was
unrelated to the government. The "governmental decisions that did af-
fect [the USOC, i.e. corporate creation, goals and purposes] were uncon-
nected with [the USOC's alleged] discriminatory policies."21 Instead,
the USOC's decision could be attributed to sound business practices and
judgment.216 The USOC was merely acting to protect its lucrative licens-
ing franchise, granted by Congress, which is the only active means by
which the USOC can raise funds. Thus, because the USOC was not act-
ing pursuant to a government created rule of conduct, part two of
Lugar's state action test was not satisfied. The majority's result,
although arrived at in a different manner, was therefore correct.
C. The Hidden Agenda in San Francisco Arts & Athletics
While in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee2 17 the Court properly concluded that the actions of
the USOC could not be attributed to the government, the majority's rea-
soning was flawed. The San Francisco Arts & Athletics Court did not rely
on Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.2" 8 in finding that no state action was
present. Instead of focusing on the second prong of the Lugar test, upon
which the Court could have easily dismissed SFAA's claim, the majority
concentrated on the state actor component of the Lugar test. In the pro-
cess, the Court ignored Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,2" 9 dis-
tinguished the Marsh v. Alabama 220 principle and, in effect, found that
part one of the state action test was not satisfied 221-a conclusion that is
contrary to precedent.
Considering the relative ease with which the Court could have dis-
posed of SFAA's discrimination claim under part two of the Lugar test,
215. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938. By contrast, in Lugar, where the Court found that Edmond-
son Oil Company was acting pursuant to state rules of conduct, Edmondson Oil Company had
no choice regarding how to pursue its litigation. Once it made the decision to take legal action,
the state, by law, mandated the procedures to be followed. Id. at 924.
216. Cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843-44 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (exer-
cising professional judgments does not sufficiently implicate government).
217. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987) [San Francisco H].
218. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
219. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). "The Court fails to mention Burton v. Wilmington Parking.Au-
thority, a case on which [SFAA] heavily relies. In each of the decisions principally relied on
today, the Court thought it important to discuss and distinguish Burton." San Francisco I1,
107 S. Ct. at 2991 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
220. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
221. San Francisco II, 107 S. Ct. at 2985.
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the majority's approach is curious. Instead of laboriously finding that
there was no state actor, the Court could have assumed arguendo that
the USOC was a state actor and then concluded that part two of the
Lugar test had not been met.
In retrospect, the Court's backward approach in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics may have signaled the end to the strict second requirement
for state action established in Lugar. The Court perhaps ignored Lugar
in an attempt to extinguish Lugar's standards for judging state action.
At the same time, the Court simply may not have been prepared to reach
the merits of SFAA's claim-that the USOC had unconstitutionally dis-
criminated against homosexuals--and therefore, purposefully secreted it-
self in the thicket of state action doctrine.
1. Current Supreme Court analysis of state action
The hint as to what may have prompted the Court's treatment of
Lugar is provided by the Supreme Court's most recent state action deci-
sion, West v. Atkins.222 In West, the Court determined that a doctor
under a contract to provide medical care to prison inmates had engaged
in state action.223 A prison inmate alleged that he had received negligent
medical care from the state-contracted doctor.224 The inmate brought an
action against the doctor for violating his eighth amendment rights.225
The district court dismissed the inmate's claim, finding that there was no
state action.226 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision. 2 7
In West, the court of appeals rested its conclusion on Polk County v.
Dodson,22 1 a case that essentially followed the Lugar analysis. In Dod-
son, a public defender withdrew from representing a criminal defendant
on appeal, on the ground that the defendant's claims were without
merit.229 The defendant subsequently brought suit against his lawyer,
alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated by the public de-
fender's withdrawal. 23 The Supreme Court held that the actions of the
public defender were not state action.231
222. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
223. Id. at 2260.
224. Id. at 2252-53.
225. Id. at 2253.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
229. Id. at 314.
230. Id. at 315.
231. Id. at 317-18.
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In determining that there was no state action, the Dodson Court
relied on a Lugar-type test.232 Part one of the test was easily satisfied
because the public defender was an agent of the state.233 Part two, how-
ever, was not met,234 for the public defender's "assignment entailed func-
tions and obligations in no way dependent on state authority."
235
Although canons of professional responsibility bound the public de-
fender, she did not act pursuant to government-created rules of con-
duct.2 3 6 The Court analogized the relationship between the criminal
defendant and the public defender to a relationship between "any other
lawyer and client. ' 237 Thus, the challenged decisions of the public de-
fender could not be ascribed to any governmental decision.23 8 Not able
to attribute the behavior of the lawyer to some governmental decision,
the criminal defendant could not bring a constitutional claim against the
public defender as there was no state action.
In West, a unanimous Supreme Court found that the court of ap-
peals' reliance on Dodson was erroneous.23 9 In finding that the actions of
the state-contracted doctor were state action, the Court was forced to
distinguish Dodson. Despite the nearly identical facts, the Court found
Dodson unpersuasive. 24 The Court simply explained that in Dodson,
there was no state action because the attorney was an adversary to the
state.241 In contrast, the relationship between the doctor and the state in
West was one of cooperation.242 This flimsy distinction provided the
Court with the opportunity to hold that the acts of the doctor constituted
state action. 43
The West decision is wholly inconsistent with Lugar. While the
doctor was an employee of the state, thus satisfying part one of the Lugar
test,2 4 the doctor did not act pursuant to governmental decisions.
Under a Lugar analysis, the doctor's conduct in West cannot be found to
232. Id.
233. A state official is a state actor. See, eg., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935-36 n.18.
234. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 317-19.
235. Id. at 318.
236. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
237. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318.
238. Id.
239. West, 108 S. Ct. at 2256.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. "In contrast to the public defender, Doctor Atkins' professional and ethical obliga-
tion to make independent medical judgments, did not set him in conflict with the State and
other prison authorities." Id.
244. "[S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor...
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 n.18.
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constitute state action just as the public defender's conduct was not state
action in Dodson. There is no government-created rule or privilege moti-
vating either the doctor or the public defender that could be determined
to have deprived another of constitutional rights. The medical scenario
of West is consistent with the legal scenario of Dodson: Both the doctor
and the lawyer acted pursuant to professional and ethical obligations, not
state law. Therefore, in finding in West that the doctor's acts were state
action, the Court ignored part two of the Lugar state action analysis.
2. Effect of San Francisco Arts & Athletics and West
In West, the Court could not avoid part two of the Lugar test by
finding that there was no state actor since the doctor was clearly an agent
of the state. Thus, the Court was forced to deal with part two of the test
and attempted to distinguish it. Yet, the message seems clear: The
Lugar test is no longer favored by the Court. Although neither San
Francisco Arts & Athletics nor West expressly overruled Lugar, the
Court's deviation from the standard may demonstrate that the Lugar test
is no longer viable for determining state action.
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Court ignored Burton24 5 and
struggled to distinguish the Marsh principle2 46 in an attempt to avoid
relying on and hence, reinforcing the legitimacy of the second part of the
Lugar test. Using part two of this state action test in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics would have injected Lugar with new life and would have pre-
vented the Court from retreating from the test with ease in later cases
such as West. By failing in San Francisco Arts & Athletics to fully ana-
lyze the USOC under the state action test, the Court easily eroded the
Lugar principle.
Given the Court's reluctance to use part two of the Lugar test, the
Court's only option was to manipulate the previous state action cases in
order to find no state actor. By finding that the USOC was not a state
actor, the Court bypassed SFAA's equal protection claim, and thereby
avoided deciding whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect
class for the purposes of equal protection.
Had the Court reached this issue, it would have found the lower
245. Justice Brennan criticized the majority for failing to distinguish Burton. San Francisco
II, 107 S. Ct. at 2991 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, the Justice noted that the
majority had relied upon cases where the Court had distinguished Burton. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
246. Id. at 2985 (Court's analysis focused on amateur sports generally rather than overall
effect of Olympics).
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courts in conflict.24 7 For example, in 1988, the Ninth Circuit held that
homosexuals are a suspect class and accordingly entitled to strict scru-
tiny in an equal protection analysis.24 8 Justices Brennan and Marshall
agree with the Ninth Circuit.249 As the Supreme Court has not yet
squarely confronted this issue,2"' such a decision would likely create
quite a political stir as homosexuality is often viewed as a question of
morality, rather than merely a matter of legal classification. 51
Although the Court has successfully avoided analyzing whether
homosexuals are a suspect class for equal protection purposes, in Bowers
v. Hardwick252 the Court did address homosexual sexual activity in a
substantive due process context.25 3  A homosexual had brought suit
against the state of Georgia, alleging that the state's sodomy law was
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.254 The statute in question criminalized all acts of consensual sod-
omy regardless of the sexual orientation of the participants. 25  By
focusing on whether the Constitution guaranteed a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, a plurality of the Court concluded that
there was no such right and therefore, the state sodomy law was
constitutional.256
247. Compare Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (homosexuals are not
quasi-suspect or suspect class) and Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) and Rich
v. Dirks, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) with Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d
1329, 1349 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexuals are suspect
class).
248. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1329. "We find not only that our analysis of each of the relevant
factors supports our conclusion, but also that the principles underlying [the] equal protection
doctrine-the principles that gave rise to these factors in the first place--compel us to con-
clude that homosexuals constitute a suspect class." Id. at 1349.
249. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). In Mad River, the Court without opinion denied certiorari of a school teacher's claim
that she had been fired from her job solely because she was a homosexual. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the denial of certio-
rari. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan stated "discrimination against homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on
their sexual preference raises significant constitutional questions under both prongs of our set-
tled equal protection analysis." Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
250. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a detailed discussion of Bow-
ers and an examination of homosexuals under an equal protection analysis, see generally Note,
Bowers v. Hardwick- A Giant Step Backfor Privacy Rights, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1013 (1987)
(authored by Randi Maurer).
251. See infra text accompanying note 259.
252. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
253. Id. at 190.
254. Id. at 188-89.
255. Id. at 188 n.l.
256. Id. at 190-91. "The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fun-
damental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the
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Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowers, pointed out the majority's
issue dodging. The Justice contended that the majority had manipulated
its result by failing to address the case as involving constitutional rights
of privacy.257 Moreover, Justice Blackmun harshly critized the majority
for focusing on sexual orientation, given the statute's broad language.258
The Court's difficulty with homosexual issues in constitutional
terms is illustrated by Chief Justice Burger's comments:
[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very "ancient roots."
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western Civilization. Condemnation of those practices is
firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards.... Blackstone described "the infamous crime against
nature" as an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, an hei-
nous act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to human
nature," and "a crime not fit to be named."... To hold that the
act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a funda-
mental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching.
259
While the decision may be difficult or unpopular, it is the duty of the
Court to enforce constitutional mandates. 2 ° Instead of continuously
manipulating the doctrine of state action to reach or avoid reaching a
result, the Court should adhere to concrete standards.
In sum, when the Supreme Court heard San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics in 1987, the Lugar test for state action may already have fallen into
disfavor. The West case decided one year later adds support to this prop-
osition. Yet, a straight forward application of the pre-Lugar state action
test would have compelled the Justices to reach SFAA's equal protection
claim. This the Court was unprepared to do. It therefore performed a
tortured analysis of state action cases in order to find that the USOC was
simply not subject to constitutional limitations of any kind.
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Id. at
190.
257. Id. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The Court's cramped reading of the issue
before it makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one." Id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). "A fair reading of the [sodomy] statute and of the complaint clearly
reveals that the majority ... distorted the question this case present[ed]." Id. at 200 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*215).
260. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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VI. CONCLUSION
After San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee26' and West v. Atkins,262 the strict state action requirements
of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.263 appear to no longer apply. The failure
of the majority to rely on Lugar signals a trend that the Court will no
longer adhere to that test.
Whether Lugar endures as an analytical weapon in the Court's arse-
nal of state action tests remains to be seen. It is possible that the Court is
returning to a standard more favorable to those challenging the conduct
of alleged state actors. The retreat from Lugar may well help these plain-
tiffs. Yet, because the state action analysis is still malleable, as illustrated
by San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Court remains free to manipulate
the doctrine to reach or avoid controversial issues.
Mitchell L. Beckloff*
261. 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987).
262. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
263. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
*The Author wishes to thank Professor Christopher N. May for his ideas and sugges-
tions in the preparation of this Note.
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